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obtained

exercise of pmver,
found
fo1·
has later entered the state
T>VATI,O>'~U because
he cannot pass the examination of a
health off1eer or
licensing board. 'l'he result is
direct conflict of authority.
Bithrr the
is ineffrctive or the state must
bow to the
of its
fundamPittal
that eonf1 iet must be resolwrl in favor
of the state."
addtrd.) 'l'he same comments apply
to the rc•ferences in the instant construction contract and
that t th' building is to br construeted in complianee with local
The j
is affirmed.
Gibson, C .
.J., and JYieComb, ,J.,

CUllCUrl'P(l

A. Xo. :!4270.

In Bank.

Oct. 19,

LOCAL 659, I.A.'r.S.E.
Corporation), Appellant, v.
COLOH CORPORATION OF A.MEIUCA, Hespondent.
[1] Arbitration- Agreements to Arbitrate.~- Code Civ. Proe.,
§ 1280, declaring- that a provision in a written contract to
settle
arbitration a controversy
out of the contract
or refusal to
the 1vhole or any part thereof "shall
be valid, enforcible and
save upon such
as
exist at law or in Pquity for tbe revocation of
contract,"
indicates that there may be instances in which
right to
enforce an arbitration
is lost.
[2] !d.-Agreements to Arbitrate-Waiver.-An arbitration proYision of a contmet may he wnived
either or both parties
litigating the
which would he arbitrable nnder thP
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Arhitrntion and
;)6.
&1il; Am.Jur., A
McK. Dig. References: [l, 2, 7] Arbitration, ~9;
~ 1-t;
Contracts. 2i33;
§ 210.

Arhi-

190

[3]
[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

LocAL 659, I.A.T.S.E. v. CoLOR CoRP. AMER. [47 C.2d
the question of such
and
to proceed to arbitrate in the manner and
is a waiver of the
to insist on
arbitration as a defense to an action on the contract.
!d.-Agreements to Arbitrate-Rescission.-There may be a
mutual rescission of an arbitration provision of a contract.
!d.-Agreements to Arbitrate-Rescission.-Where a collective
between local unions and an emfor dismissal pay and for
arbitration of disputes provided that the employer would not
be liable for dismissal pay if an employee was dismissed
"for any other cause or causes beyond the control of the producer," and a dispute subsequently arose between the employer and the unions as to whether the employer was liable
under such provision for dismissal pay to employees dismissed
as a result of the employer's closing its plant, affidavits showrepeated refusals by one local union to arbitrate the dispute and a repudiation of the arbitration provision and
acceptance thereof by the employer could support a conclusion
that there was a mutual rescission of the provision for arbitration.
Contracts-Performance- Excuses for Nonperformance.-A
repudiation of a contract accepted by the promisor excuses
performance by the promisee. (Civ. Code, § 1511.)
Id.-Abandonment.-An abandonment of a contract may be
implied from acts of the parties, and this may be accomplished
by repudiation of the contract by one party and acquiescence
of the other in such repudiation.
Arbitration-Agreements to Arbitrate.-Assuming the right to
enforce provisions of Lab. Code, § 222, relating to withholding
part of wages established by collective bargaining, cannot
be and is not waived by an arbitration provision, a person's
conduct in pursuing the remedy provided for under that code
section is some evidence that he does not intend to arbitrate.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County dismissing a proceeding for an order directing arbitration. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Affirmed.
Joseph W. Fairfield and Ethelyn F. Black for Appellant.
Pauline Nightingale and Leon H. Berger as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellant.
Irving A. Bernstein for Respondent.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 229; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 381
et seq.
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CARTER, J.-Pursuant to the
conarbitration (Code Civ.
1280-1293), Aller,
petitioner, the business
of a union, Local 659,
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Machine Operators (by stipulation the union
was substituted as
in place of Aller), filed against
defendant, Color Corporation of America, a corporation
inafter referred to as Color), asking that Color be required
to arbitrate a dispute under a collective bargaining agreement.
Defendant answered, its main claim being that petitioner
had lost its right to have the arbitration provision in the
collective bargaining agreement enforced because it had repudiated and waived it. After hearing on the petition, the
court gave judgment dismissing the proceeding and awarding
costs to defendant. Petitioner appeals.
It is not disputed, and the court found, that Color, engaged
in the film processing business, had collective bargaining
agreements with five other unions in addition to petitioner
and all contracts contained the same arbitration clause. The
clause provided three steps in grievance procedure for settling
disputes with regard to wages, hours or other conditions of
employment, and the interpretation of the agreement, the
first two being an attempt by representatives of Color, the
employer, and the unions to settle the dispute. Failing settlement, the third provides for the appointment of an arbitrator
by the parties within 10 days thereafter to settle it. Either
party may proceed under the arbitration clause. Any griev<mce for the payment of dismissal pay not presented under
the first step shall be deemed waived unless presented 365
days after the employee becomes entitled to such pay. Under
the collective bargaining agreements employees are entitled
to ''dismissal pay'' but the employer is not liable therefor if
the employee was dismissed ''for any other cause or causes
beyond the control of the" employer, Color. In 1954, Color
closed its plant and dismissed all of its employees, including
Krog, Ragin and Moore who were members of petitioner,
Local 659. In August, 1954, a dispute arose between Color
and the unions as to whether the dismissed union employees
should receive dismissal pay inasmuch as Color claimed that
under the bargaining agreement the dismissals were for causes
beyond their control and the union contending otherwise. All
of the unions except petitioner, Local 659, and defendant proceeded with the grievance and arbitration procedure and those

the other unions were refused by
failed and refused to comply with
and instead elected to and did bring
proceedings
before the state labor commissioner to collect dismissal pay.
Petitioner argues that under the law it could not lose its
right to have the arbitration provision enforced and under
the faets, as a matter of
it did not. Defendant urges that
petitioner lost his right to arbitration and the evidence supports the trial eourt 's
in this respect. No question
here involved was subis raised as to whether the
ject to arbitration under the arbitration statute and the
eollecti ve bargaining contract.
'l'he evidence on the subject is by affidavit and letters. In
an affidavit by Bernstein, eounsel for Color, offered by Color,
it is stated: That on August 5th and 12th, 1954, he explained
defendant's position on the dispute to petitioner's representatives, that is, that it was not liable for dismissal pay. On
the 18th, it agreed with rounsel for the unions other than
petitioner, that grievance and arbitration procedure was
necessary; on August
he was advised that the labor
commissioner had issued an order (dated August 19th) to
appear before him on a eharge by petitioner that defendant
was invoking section 222 of the !Jabor Code,* that he explained the arbitration provision to the commissioner; that on
September 2d he met with the commissioner and petitioner's
representative Nave and asked Nave to dismiss the complaint
before the commissioner and arbitrate under the bargaining
agreement but Nave refused; that after some correspondence
with the commissioner, Stone, defendant's vice president, on
'It shall be unlawful, in case of any wage
arrived at
through eollec.tive bargaining, either wilfully or
or with intent
to defraud an employee, a competitor, or any other person, to withhold
from said employee any
of the wage agreed upon.'' (Lab. Code,
9 222.) A violation of
section is a misdemeanor. (ld., § 225.)
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~~opy to petitioner)
and
: "By this
J;oeal 659 [petitioner],
are requiring us to defend onr position in court in the
of the fact that our bargaining agreement provides other\Ve intend to llold both ~-ou and Local 659 fully refor all consequences resulting from this ill-advised
action" that on September 29th petitioner wrote to Stone
: "Our dispute with you is not a matter of interpretation but one of non-payment and we are prepared to show that
yon have wilfully refused to .make such payment and that
were not compelled to go out of business, as you claimed
:von \Wre in the defense raised in the arbitration proceeding.
Even that is not a good defense in the current hearing with
the other unions, but since they haYe elected to take the other
course, that is their problem. The best way to settle this
matter is to let everyone testify under oath and I would
ee1·tainly expeet you to be very willing to aeeept this judicial
proeess of settling disputes. After all, when one is under
oath, the truth and only the truth will prevail"; that on
September 27th the eommission advised defendant that petitioner insisted on eriminal proeeedings and the matter will
be referred to the "eity attorney." Stone's affidavit, offered
defendant, stated that he had a "great many telephone
eonversations" with Aller before and after ,January 11, 1955,
and prior to Aller's letter of September 29th, 1954. he made
' repeated demands" upon Aller that I1oeal 659 abide by the
terms of the bargaining and arbitrate the dispute; that
after the reeeipt of that letter "and in every subsequent conversation, I informed Mr. Aller that the Company considered his ta('ties in this whole matter to be reprehensible,
that the Company fdefendant 1 ehose to eonsider those tacties
and his unequivoeal refusal to arbitrate as a repudiation and
breach of the eontraet, and that the Company would no longer
eonsent to an arbitration''; he ackno\vledged receiving the
letters AJler mentions in his affidavit but rlenies the agreement mentioned by Aller.
Aller in his affidavit on behalf of petitioner stated he denied
Local 659 had evrr refused to arbitrate the dispute but defendant refused to cooperate and he and Stone agreed to
''hold in abeyanee'' all disputes until one of the other union's
(Loeal 683) arbitration had been completed; he refers to
lett01·s he says he sent to Stone during January, March and
47 C.2d-7

CoLOR CoRP. A:.rER.

C.2d

uco>.Ll<LLlUJLHt> arbitration inasmuch as the arbitra~
tion with Local 683 had been favorable
that union.
The question thus
whether or not there has
been a
mutual
or
estoppel by or on behalf of
in the enforcement of
the arbitration clause. We are not concerned here with any
question involving the
or violation of the terms
of the bargaining agreement other than the arbitration provision. (See conflict of authorities on that subject: 3 A.L.R
2d 383.) [1] Section 1280 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that a provision in a written contract to settle by
arbitration a controversy arising out of the contract or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof ''shall be
valid, enforcible and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in eqttity for the revocation of any contract"
(emphasis added). It is thus indicated that there may be
instances in which the right to enforce an arbitration provision is lost. This is further shown by other provisions.
A party aggrieved by the failure or refusal of another to perform under a contract providing for arbitration may have
the provision enforced by the court; the court shall hear the
matter and on being satisfied the failure to comply with the
arbitration ''is not in issue'' shall order the arbitration to
proceed; if "default" be in issue, that shall be tried. (Id.,
§ 1282.) If any action be brought on the issue arising out
of the contract for arbitration the court shall stay the action
upon being satisfied that the issue is referable to arbitration
provided the ''applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with" the arbitration. (Id., § 1284.) It is also evident
that defendant could have proceeded to enforce the provision
for arbitration under the code when petitioner refused to
arbitrate.
[2] Iu harmony with the arbitration statute, supra, it
has been held that the arbitration provision of a contract
may be waived by either or both of the parties by litigating
the dispute which would be arbitrable under the provision
and not raising the question of the arbitration provision
(Case v. Kadota Fig Assn., 35 Cal.2d 596 [220 P.2d 912];
Trnbowitch v. Rivm·bank Canning Co., 30 Cal.2d 335 [182
P.2d 182] ; Jones v. Pollock, 34 Cal.2d 863 [215 P.2d 733] ;
Landreth v. Sotdh Coast Rock Co., 136 Cal.App. 457 [29
P.2d 225]; Pierce v. Wright, 117 Cal.App.2d 718 [256 P.2d
1049] ; Fejer v. Paonessa, 104 Cal.App.2d 190 [231 P.2d
507] ; Wilson v. Mattei, 84 Cal.App. 567 [258 P. 453] ; 161
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302 see
Dept.
Inc. v.
320 [252 P.2d 418])
that a
failure by a party to proceed to arbitrate in the manner and
at the time provided in the arbitration provision is a waiver
of the right to insist on arbitration as a defense to an action
Pneucrete
v. United States Fid.
on the contract.
& Guar.
7 Cal.App.2d 733 [46 P.2d 1000] ; Jordan v.
f1'rt<9am~an. 72 Cal.App.2d 726 [165 P.2d 728]; see 117 A.L.R.
302; 161
1426.) [3] There may be a mutual rescission
Drake v. Stein, 116 Cal.App.2d 779 [254 P.2d 613]). It
has been said: ''In the light of present-day arbitration statutes,
most agreements to arbitrate future disputes are likely to be
held to be lawful and valid; and under such statutes the
courts may stay proceedings at law and order the arbitration
to go forward. When one of the parties is resisting such an
order, the court must make two principal determinations before issuing it. First was a valid agreement to arbitrate ever
made by the parties and is it still operative 1 Secondly, does
the dispute that now exists fall within the terms of that agreement, reasonably interpreted 1 In the present action we
are dealing only with the former of these questions.
'. . . the arbitration agreement . . . if lawful, may have
been rescinded, repudiated, or avoided. The parties to such
an agreement have power to rescind it by mutual agreement
to that effect. The ordinary arbitration statutes do not deprive them of this power. The parties may, however, rescind other agreements that they have made, without intending
to affect their agreement to arbitrate disputes. The agreement to arbitrate may be wholly separate from other transactions; or, although contained in a single written instrument
with other provisions, it may be wholly independent of themseparate and collateral agreement.
"Although one party can not by himself 'rescind' a conhe can wrongfully 'repudiate' it. What is the effect
of his repudiation T To answer this, we must first interpret
his expressions and determine the coverage of the repudiation.
Suppose :first that he repudiates the agreement to arbitrate
itself. By such a repudiation he does not deprive the other
of his right to arbitration; and if the repudiator brings
action in breach of his valid arbitration agreement the
defendant can defend on the ground that arbitration is a
condition precedent, or under a statute can obtain a stay
an order to arbitrate, or can counterclaim for damages.
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But such a
no
The other
can now
his action in reliance on the
repudiation, or otherwise change his position in reliance.
Thereafter, the repudiator has no power of retraction and can
not insist on the remedy by arbitration. . . .
"In determining whether
repudiation or other vital
breach of a contract should
a
of his right to
an arbitration of the existing dispute, the court should consider the form and extent of the repudiation or breach and
the reasons for which it occurred. A repudiation that clearly
includes the arbitration provision itself should prevent the
repudiator from using it in defense when sued in the courts.
If the provision is not itself repudiated and the issue that is
raised by the alleged breach is one that is within the coverage
of the provision, the defendant should be supported in insisting on arbitration of the issue unless his bad faith and
wilful misconduct are sufficiently obvious to justify a discretionary refusal of such support.'' (Corbin on Contracts,
§ 1443.) In Tas-T-Ntd Co. v. Continental Nnt Co., 125 Cal.
App.2d 351, 354 [270 P.2d 43], the court, while holding the
evidence insufficient to show a waiver or repudiation of an
arbitration provision, proceed~d to discuss applicable principles. It said: ". . . it has often been held the right to
arbitrate can be waived [citations 1, and that whether or not
waiver has taken place is ordinarily a question of fact, yet
we are compelled to hold upon the record here that there is
no support for the trial court's finding that the appellant
had ever waived the provision of the contract binding the
parties to proceed in arbitration if controversies arose between them. The right to arbitrate is of course possessed by
each party to the agreement and notwithstanding one party
may impede the normal course of arbitration such conduct
cannot dispense with the right of the other party to compel
it. Our statute affords complete remedies to implement and
to specifically enforce this right. If, therefore, one party
to an arbitration agreement has by dilatory tactics or an
express refusal to proceed with arbitration placed himself in
such a position that the other party could accede to the
abandonment of the arbitration elause, yet such party need
not do so . . . . Bnt this is an election whieh it must make
fm· it eannot lH~ep alive in itst>lf the
to arbitrate and
at the Rame time deny it to its
(Krauss Bros.
Lln·. Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons . 62 F.2d 1004, 1006.) Said
the court as to one party to an arbitration agreement who
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action in a state
action was indeed a
of the
to arbitrate it gave the defendant
the plaintiff at its word, to put an end to
arbitration
or to insist upon
By
in the answer it chose the second course . . . . It is
true that
did not follow this up .by selecting an arbitrator
as it had
to do. Until it did, it was therefore not
in position to
of the action under section
5 of the New York Arbitration Aet . . . and delay to do so
might indeed forfeit its recourse to that remedy. . . . But,
so far as concerned the plaintiff's repudiation, it had ehosen
not to call off the clause, not to "rescind" it; and it could
not prevent the plaintiff's resumption of the remedy, while
its own position remained unchanged.'
"The above holding by the federal eourt is no more than
an application of the familiar rule that if an agreement be
breached the party against whom the breaeh is committed
may refuse to accept the breaeh or terminate the eontract,
thus keeping the eontract alive, but that if he does so he
keeps it alive both for the benefit of himself and for that
of the other contracting party. (Williston on Contraets, rev.
ed., § 684; Alder v. Drndis, 30 Cal.2d 372, 381 [182 P.2d
195].)"
[4] In the instant case it appears that the dispute under
the collective bargaining agreement arose in August, 1954
between petitioner and all the other unions and the other
unions commenced the grievance and arbitration procedure.
Petitioner however, refused to participate. 'l'he dispute with
all the unions was exactly the same, whether dismissal pay
was to be paid under the eontract. In the same month petitioner complained to the state labor commissioner that pay
(dismissal pay) was being withheld contrary to section 222
of the Labor Code, supra, and the eommissioner issued his
order for a hearing on that subject. On September 29th
petitioner, by Aller, wrote the letter to defendant heretofore
quoted and it was in response to a demand that petitioner
arbitrate. While not too clear, that letter is readily susceptible of the construction that petitioner did not wish to arbitrate but preferred to proceed before the labor commissioner.
any case, Stone's affidavit shows that defendant's repeated
demands on petitioner, both before and after the letter, that

of the arbitration provision and refusal to arbitrate was hreaeh of the eontract
and defendant would ''no
eon sent'' to arbitration.
There
some eonflict on the matter
reason of Aller's
affidavit but the resolution of
eonfliet was for the trial
l:ourL Even if the letter did not eonstitute an
refusal to
Stone's affidaYit shows other nne>nn"m"
r0fnsals and defendant's
thereof. :B"'or the same
reason it is not necessary to eonsider the
before
the labor eommissioner; there is sufficient without it. Aller
in his letters to Stone of
and thereafter indicated a desire to arbitrate, but we take it from Bernstein's
and Stone's afiidaYits that there had before then been a
repudiation of the arbitration provision and acceptance thereof by defendant. Indeed, it may well be concluded from
those affidavits that there was a mutual rescission of the provision for arbitration.
[5] A repudiation of a eontract aerepted by the promisor
excuses performance by the promisee. (Bomberger v. McKelvey, 35 Cal.2d 607 [220 P.2d 729]; Walker v. Harbor
Business Blocks Co., 181 Cal. 773 [186 P. 356]; Civ. Code,
§ 1511.) [6] And it is said in DesseTt Seed Co. v. Garb~ts,
66 Cal.App.2d 838, 847 [153 P.2d 184]: "It is well settled
that an abandonment of a contract may be implied from the
aets of the parties and this may be accomplished by the
repudiation of the eontraet by one of the parties and by the
acquieseenee of the other party in sueh repudiation. This
doctrine is supported by many eases. [Citations.]
"In support of the court's :findings and judgment, the
evidence would warrant a conclusion that there had been a
mutual abandonment or rescission of the oral contract."
Amicus curiaeq.' contends on behalf of petitioner on petition for hearing in this court that the proceeding by petitioner
before the labor commissioner and the steps for enforcement
by the commissioner of section 222 of the Labor Code, supra,
cannot be considered as an election of remedies by petitioner
as it would mean that the arbitration provisions would control
over that section and the policy thereby established by the
Ijegislature relying upon Pnetterete Corp. v. Un£ted States
Fid. & Gnar. Co., 7 Cal.App.2d 733 [46 P.2d 10001, and
Wallace v. Carpenters Local Union, 137 Cal.App.2d 468
*The State Labor Commissioner.
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the Pneucrete ease the court deelared
that au aetion would lie on a materialman's bond given by
the contractor as required by statute when there was a construction contract between the contractor and a flood control
district, even though there was an arbitration provision in
the construction contract because the bond was
by
statute and to allow arbitration to prevent an action thereon
requiring the bond. In the
would frustrate the
Wallace case it was held that the employer could obtain an
injunction authorized by the law
jurisdictional strikes
(I1ab. Code, §§ 1115-1120) even though there was an arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement. It is unnecessary to pass upon that point, however, because the judgment is otherwise supportable as seen from the foregoing
discussion. Moreover, we see no frustration in the policy
declared in section 222 in treating a proceeding thereunder
as some indication that petitioner was abandoning or repudiating the arbitration provision.
[7] Assuming the right to enforce the provisions of section 222 cannot be and is not waived by an arbitration provision, a person's conduct in pursuing the remedy provided
for under this section is some evidence that he does not intend
to arbitrate. \Vhat the labor commissioner or a prosecuting
attorney may or may not do in enforcing the section has no
bearing on the arbitration provision, but what the party to
the contract containing the arbitration clause does, may throw
some light on his intention.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
and McComb, J., concurred.

